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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE O·F UTAH, 
Responden.f, 
KENNETH JOE BARKER, 
Ap~pellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The appellant was convicted of the crime of carnal 
knowledge before the Sixth Judicial District Court of 
the State of U~tah, in and for Garfield County, and it is 
from this conviction that he appeals. 
STATEJ\fENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's brief contains a detailed summary of 
the proceedings and evidence presented to the court and 
jury upon which the conviction was based and it i.s felt 
that a recapitulation of the factR at this ti1ne would serve 
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no useful purpose to this Honorable Court. Where neces-
sary, however' reference will be made to the testimony 
in the transcript which respondent feels may aid this 
Honorable Court in properly interpreting the facts in 
accordanc-e with its theory of the case. The Assignments 
of l~rror and Arguments in support thereof will be 
answered in the order presented by the appellant. 
ASSERTION NO. I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING TESTI-
MONY ELICITED FROM THE MOTHER OF THE PROSE-
CUTRIX. 
ASSERTION NO. 2 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFEN-
DANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The only claim of appellant, in his two a;ssign1nents 
of error, is that the court committed prejudicial error 
to the substantial rights of the accused, in admitting 
over objection by counsel for the accused, the testimony 
of 1\{rs. Marsha Cope, mother of the prosecutrix, whose 
testimony appellant contends was purely hearsay and 
not admissible as part of the "res gestae." ·It is the 
contention of the respondent on the other hand that the 
disputed testimony of Mr.s. Cope was properly admitted 
under any one of several exceptions to the ''hearsay'' 
rule, or that in any event, if her testi1nony was errone-
ously ad1nitted, it was harmless error and certainly did 
not adversely affect the rights of ~the accused. 
This Honorable Court has on numerous and repeated 
occasions reiterated the unanimous holding of the court~ 
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that in rnpe cases the testimony of the prosecuting \vit-
ness, or that of other \Yitnesses, is admissible for the pur-
pose of sho,ving that the prosecutrix made complaint 
of the outrage soon after its commission. See St·ate v. 
Ha1ford, 18 Utah 3, 5+ Pac. 819, State v. Neel, 21 Utah 
131, 60 Pac. 310; Sta.te v. Inzlay, 22 Utah 156, 61 Pac. 
557; Sta.te v. Christensen, 73 Utah 575, 276 Pac. 163; 
State v. Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 63 P. (2d) 584, State v. 
Tellay, 100 Utah 25, 110 P. (2d) 342. Although there is 
not unanimity among the courts, it is generally held in 
this connection that the details and circums'tances of the 
complaints or declarations of the p~rosecutrix are not 
usually admissible in evidence unless they are part of 
the ''res gestae,'' but the testimony is limited to ~the fact 
that such complaints or declarations were made. Whar-
ton's ''Criminal Evidence'' Vol. 1 Sec. 521; Wigmore on 
Evidence, Third Edition Vol. 14, Sec. 1135 and see the 
Utah cases cited supra. 
Recognizing the above rules, respondent respectfully 
aubmits that Mrs. Cope's testimony in effect revealed 
nothing more than that her daughter at a certain time 
and place and under cer'iain circumstances made conl-
plaint that an outrage had been committed upon her. It is 
felt that this testimony was no more than was reasonably 
necessary to show the time and place where the corn-
plaint was made, the circumstances under which it was 
made, the person to 'vhom made, and the conduct of the 
prosecutrix at the time .she made complaint and tha't 
she exhibited physical indications that an outrage had 
been committed upon her as ronfirmatory of her testi .. 
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mony, which evidence IS always admissible. 22 R.C.L. 
Sec. 49, page 1214. 
A sin1ilar line of testimony was elicited by the di~­
trict attorney in the case of State v. Roberts, 91 1Ttah 
117, 63 P. (2d) 584, when the witness was asked: 
"Q. What did she say with reference to that 
and what had happened~ 
A. Why she says 1\fr. Roberts had taken her out 
on the highway some place and ... 
~[r. Larson: I want to object to that question for 
~the reason it is hearsay, no part of the res 
gestae, a statement made out of the presence 
of the defendant at a time when he wasn't 
present, a considerable length of time after 
the alleged occurrence.'' 
The objection "\Vas overruled. The witness 
thereupon an,vered: 
''She said he had taken her out on the highway 
and forced intercourse. She says: 'I am al-
most ripped to pieces.' " 
In affirming the judgment of conviction this court held 
in the course of its opinion: 
''Aside from her having named the defen-
dant, the statement of the prosecutrix in the in-
s·tant case did not attempt to describe details. It 
sin1ply tended to show that the act of intercourse 
had been consummated by force and violence. A 
case somewhat similar is People v. Rotello, :i39 
Ill. 448, 171 N.E. 540. We think that under the 
authority of these cases no reversible error was 
con1mitted in receiving this tesltimony.'' 
Even assuming, for purpose of argument, tha't the 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
district attorney n1ay haY<> probed further into the 
details and particulars in the instant case than ordinarily 
w·ould be condoned by the authorities, it is respectfully 
subn1itted that this testin1ony \vas properly admitted 
under either one of t\vo other theories as exceptions 
to the hearsay rule. Counsel for appellant concedes that 
the spontaneous declarations of a prosecutrix are ad-
nlissible as part of the "res gestae" but argues that in 
this instance they did not con1e within that exception 
because they '""ere made calmly and deliberately in a 
long dra\vn-out narrative form after she had had ample 
time for deliberation and reflection. It is the contention 
of respondent that these declarations were properly ad-
nlitted as part of the "res gestae." The transcript will 
definitely show that only thirty minutes elapsed from 
the time the prosecutrix left the scene of the . offense 
until she, in a .serni-hysterical state, still suffering fron1 
the humiliation and emotional upset of the outrage which 
had been committed upon her, made the declarations to 
her mother ( Tr. p. 36-37). 
In discussing the remoteness of time from a partic-
ular event as to when the declarations of a party may 
be considered part of ~the ''res gestae,'' it is said in 
.J one.s ''Commentaries on Evidence,'' Second Edition, 
~rr. 1204 at page 2210: 
·'It is impractical to fix, by general rule, any 
instant of time at which it may be said to be too 
late for an act or declaration to l )e part of the re.s 
gestae and so as ~to preclude debate and conflict 
of opinion in regard to this particular point. So 
long, ho"rpyer, aR suspieion of fabrication is ab-
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sent, and no taint of preconceived action or sug-
gestion of design is present the fact that there 
is a slight interval between the declaration and 
the principal transaction, and that they are not 
entirely synchronous, does not affect its adnli~s­
ibility as part of the res gestae." 
There are numerous cases cited in 2 A.L.R. 1525 as 
~upplemented in 157 A.L.R. 1359 where the admission of 
~nch co1npaints, statements or declarations made several 
minutes after~ and even as much as an hour and a half 
after the offense was committed was held not to he error. 
It would appear that under the circumstances of this 
0ase the s~t.atements and declarations were properly ad-
mitted because there could certainly be no ''suspicion 
of fabrication'' or ''taint of preconceived action or sug-
gestion of design.'' To deny the admissibility of the 
statements and declarations in this case would in effect 
be an attempt to "exclude everything from the res 
gestae which did not occur on the very instant of the 
grinding of the flesh and bones'' to borrow a phrase 
quoted in Peirce v. ~am Duren, 78 Fed. 707, 24 C.C.A. 
280; 69 L.R.A. 705. 
It is respectfully submitted likewise that the dis-
puted testimony of Mrs. Cope, even if not considered 
part of the ''res gestae,'' \vas properly ad1ni ttec1 under 
the principle, generally accepted by the authorities, that 
such evidence may be received \Vhenever the details or 
particulars are inquired into on cross-examination or 
whenever an atitempt is made to impeach the credibility 
of the testimony of the prosecutrix. As said in State v. 
Orlando, 119 N.J.L. 175, 194 Atl. 879, in \vhirh the rourt 
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adn1itted thr testilnony of a physician who examined 
the prosecutrix \Yithin an hour or t\YO after the alleged 
attack concerning the details of her complaint against 
defendant: 
~ ~ ''T e think that the testimony was properly 
admitted for the purpose of rehabilitating the 
credibility of the prosecutrix in the circumstances 
of the case. 
* * * :11: 
"Now it is widely held in rape cases thBJt 
evidence of the details of the complaint of the 
prosecutrix as made to another is admissible for 
the purpose of 'rehabiliting the credibility' of the 
prosecutrix after, as here, she has testified as a 
witness and has been impeached and the cred-
ibility of her testimony has been attacked on. 
cross-examination. 2 Wigmore on Evidence (2d 
Ed.) Sec 1138, Sec 1760; 22 R.C.L. 1215, par. 48, 
n.i. ; 3 Greenleaf on Evidence (16th Ed.) Sec. 213; 
Underhill Crim. Evidence (4th Ed.) Sec. 668, and 
cases cited there.'' 
Furthermore, see the striking statement of the cour1t 
In Griffin r. State, 76 ~· 29, wherein it was· held: 
'• ''Then the complaint constitutes no part of the 
res gestae, and is received only as corroborative 
of her testimony, neither the particulars detailed 
by her, nor the name of the person whom she 
mentioned as the offender, can be given in evi-
dence in the first instance. But the defendant 
n1ay, on c.ross-examinati.on, inquire into the p~ar­
ticnlars of the comp~lari.nt, and thus m~ak.e ·admiss-
ible el'idPnce rela.ting thereto by both parttes; or, 
if the defendant introrl?tres e1'idrnce to impeach 
the prosrrutri.r, the prosrru.tri.r 1nay S1,f.stain her 
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by showing that her sta.tements in mak·ing the 
compla.itnt, and her testi.mony on the trial, cor-
respond. Scott v. State, 48 Ala. 420; Nichols v. 
Stew;art, 20 Ala, 358; Tho1npson v. State. 38 Ind. 
39; B~accio v. People, 41 N.Y. 265; 3 Greenl, on EL'. 
sec. 213; 2 Birch. Crim. Proc. see. 963. 
It is finally the contention of the respondent that 
even if the ~trial court improperly admitted the disputed 
testimony of Mrs. Cope, it was harmless error and did 
not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused. 
The rule is too well recognized to need citation of auth-
ority that an error commit~ted in the court below ·will 
not 'varrant a reversal of the judgment of conviction 
unless it has in some way prejudiced the substantial 
rights of the accused. In the present case, it will be seen 
that the very testimony concerning which appellant 
complains was gone into in minute detail in the cross 
examination of the prosecutrix. (Trancript pages 21-24) 
It seems rather improbable that the teBtimony of Mrs. 
Cope, concerning the declaration made to her by lthe 
prosecutrix, could have prejudicially influenced or 
swayed the jury in view of the type of testimony which 
was so colorfully portrayed for them in the cross exam-
ination of the prosecutrix by counsel for appellant. 
CONCLU:SION 
It is respectfully submitted that ~the testimony of Mrs. 
Cope was properly admitted in evidence under any one 
of the theories propounded above and that even if it 
should be determined by this Honorable Court that the 
trial court erroneously admitted this testimony, that it 
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'vas harn1less error and did not prejudice the rights of 
the accused so as to "Tarrant a reversal of the judgment. 
It is submitted that the eveidence in the record esta-
blished justific~tion for the unprejudiced verdict of the 
jury rendered below, and that it should therefor be af .. 
firmed by thi.s Honorable Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. \TERNON 
Attorney General 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON. 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorn-eys for Respondent 
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